Although common gains and asymmetry of information are complementary principles, they have different causal mechanisms. In the event of common benefits, cooperation is not sufficiently present, as the benefits of cooperation are not significant enough in relation to the non-cooperative status quo. In the case of information asymmetry, there is non-cooperation because states lack credible information on reliability or institutional preferences. This distinction allows us to theorize the cause and effect mechanisms that affect defence cooperation. Profit-sharing mechanisms promote cooperation by deferring the relative benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, thereby increasing demand, while information mechanisms promote cooperation by reducing or eliminating information asymmetries and thereby increasing supply. Governments are increasingly turning to DCAs to improve their military capabilities. For example, since the 1990s, Bulgaria has been waging a modernization campaign involving dozens of DCAs which, according to US diplomats, “are based on the premise that Bulgaria is facing new asymmetric security threats and not traditional threats to its territory.” Footnote 57 In 2011, Indonesia sued the DCA with a large number of partners, including Russia, South Korea, China, Serbia and India – to “modernize the country`s most important weapons system.” Footnote 58 Modernization also includes research and development and industrial cooperation. In 2005, the Ukrainian Defence Minister argued that a DCA with Russia would exploit the “scientific and industrial potential of Ukraine and Russia” and allow “co-production agreements for defence companies in the development and production of armaments and military equipment”. Footnote 59 Officer exchanges and training programs present another source of military capabilities. After a deal with Australia in 2006, a Philippine defence official said: “It`s like a basketball game.

We need to train with other players from other teams to learn new skills and techniques to raise the level of our game.¬†Footnote 60 The Minister of Defence said: “In three years, we could increase the military will from 45% to 70%.” Footnote 61 Second, the common benefits of defence cooperation should increase accordingly when governments face common security threats, whether intergovernmental or not, to the common benefits of defence cooperation. The perception of a common threat is a long-standing motivation for defence pacts. Footnote 73 In addition, the threat level in standard models of public goods directly determines the benefits and therefore the demand for defence cooperation. Footnote 74 I`m expecting an analog relationship with the DCAs.